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0:02
Introduction to Wittgenstein and the philosophy of Mind
0:06
For many centuries mankind has been reflecting on the nature of men.
0:11
What does it mean that we are conscious beings? What is the significance of us having bodies? What kind of amazing creatures we are? What am I? The answers can be summarized thus… 1. only bodies exist. 2. only the Mind exists. 3. both Mind and bodies exist. These are the three main positions of what is called ‘Metaphysics’, that is: the search for ultimate reality.
0:38
I’ll summarize with three theses and three corresponding self-images.
0:43
The first thesis reads: All is matter. This is the position of Materialism, or Physicalism. The corresponding self image is: I am a brain or something similarly fully physical.
0:57
The second: both matter and Mind exist. Here we have Dualism. It’s self image is: I am a Mind and I have a (causal) relation to my body. The third thesis: all is Mind. This is what we call Subjective idealism. It says: I am a Mind in a purely spiritual universe.
1:19
Other positions are possible, for instance ‘Mysterianism’. This is the conviction that the relation between Mind and body is essentially too complex to understand. Still: most opinions – quite a lot – can be situated in the three groups of the positions mentioned earlier.
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Until this day and age, these separate views – especially Dualism versus Materialism – give rise to fierce debate. Many times I had the impression that at the core of these discussions, something thoroughly is amiss. This hunch was being confirmed when – in the course of years – I started to understand the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
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Wittgenstein never argues in favour of one of these three Metaphysical positions.
2:03
I don’t deny any thing, he persistently said. With this statement he already cancels out two of the three varieties. Because he neither rejects the existence of physical things (why should he?), nor mental things (why should he?).
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Regarding Materialism, it is clear that Wittgenstein is far from satisfied with it. All things that really concern us: ethics, values, the meaning of life, all these are simply no physical entities. The theory of Subjective Idealism denies the existence of matter. Taken literally, in a way, this includes denying the existence of tables and hands other than experienced. This is also alien to what he thinks.
2:45
So, might Dualism be an option for Wittgenstein? On the contrary, in all his writings Dualism comes out worst. Wittgenstein is one of the philosophers of the twentieth century for whom Dualism is not an answer, but rather a challenge: how to overcome it?
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A lot of philosophy, including spontaneous layman opinions, many times presupposes implicitly or explicitly that Minds and bodies exist next to each other and influence their counterpart, either one-sided or reciprocally. It turns out rather difficult to avoid this assumption.
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But why would he think such a thing? Are there proper arguments that he brings forward? According to some, indeed there are such arguments to be found, though I cannot find them. At least: not in the style of argumentation that is typically found within philosophy.
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Wittgenstein was fascinated by language, and his views have been developed in that context: reflecting on what language is, and especially: how it works. By and large, his conclusion was that most philosophical questions and answers are generally based upon a kind of ‘misuse’ of regular language.
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Based upon a mistake of what the meaning of words is and in what way words actually have a meaning.
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Over and over again, we see how he is tempted by the standard way of Philosophy, and we see his painstaking efforts to release himself from it.
4:11
Take a familiar philosophical expression, that seems to be true beyond doubt: ‘every thing is equal to itself’, or, similarly: ‘every thing is identical to itself’. This statement is also called ‘the law of identity’. Wittgenstein can imagine some kind of meaning, some kind of use of the expression. At least the following image. First you have something, say a bike. Then you can picture that it is gone. In fact, one day this happened to me. At the location
4:41
where I left it some time ago, I found a gaping void. This void was shaped in the form of my bike. Were you to return the bike in this exact space, it would fill it perfectly. Just like every spot exactly fits its own environment. In an expression like ‘every thing is equal to itself’, we make use of the word ‘equal’. Two things can be equal in one or more aspects. For instance: apples and peaches have their roundness in common, in this they are equal. So,
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when you have one single thing, for which not only one or two aspects coincide, but for which none of its aspects differ, you could surely say that it is equal to itself, right?
5:22
This is an example of ‘bewitchment by language’, in the words of Wittgenstein. The fact that a meaningful expression is very similar to another expression, does not mean that the second is also meaningful. At least not in the same way. Actually the word ‘equal’ is fully dissimilar when used with apples and peaches compared to a bike that would be equal to itself. If the word ‘equal’ means anything in the bike example, it is fully different from the other, regular cases.
5:52
Let’s take another, simple example. Using the word ‘equal’ to compare separate things, or even to point out that they are in some aspect equivalent, that is normal and definitely meaningful use of language. For instance: a 100 dollars is equal to 89 euro’s. This is a fine case of communication. Here we justifiably say that we provide information. In a way you state that for so many dollars, you can buy something worth so many euro’s. And you
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use the word in the same way when you state that a 100 dollars is equal to 10.745 yen.
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The expression ‘x dollars equal y euro’s’ appears to be similar to ‘x dollars equals x dollars’. But there is a huge contrast, in that the second can hardly have any purpose.
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It is not to say that the opposite is true, that x dollars do not equal x dollars. But it is easy to see, after some pondering, that the ‘truth’ it might contain, is fully disparate compared to the regular expressions that equal currencies. To try to take ‘x dollars equals x dollars’ as a serious statement in the manner of ‘x dollars equals y euro’s’, says Wittgenstein, is similar to asking a person about his length, where the guy stands up tall, puts a hand on
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his head and exclaims: that high. Is he wrong? Not really. It is the exact length that we are talking about. But his action is not an answer to the question. It’s doesn’t answer a question at all.
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The positions as mentioned can be condensed to the two remarks that cover the self-images:
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I am a brain and I am a Mind. What about ‘I am a brain’? This looks similar to innocent statements like ‘I am a clerk’, or ‘I am a mammal’. Can we investigate this expression to see its meaning? Is this again an expression that looks similar to regular and valid expressions, but which might mean nothing, or something fully different, from what it pretends to mean?
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Anyway, this is not a regular answer on the question: who are you?, or what are you? These questions are typically answered by displaying what is special for you, to what groups you belong, etc. Your name, your profession, your ethnic background, many remarks can state a superficial or thorough answer. But, maybe the question what we are deep down, or essentially, is answered here? Might it be an interesting report on the nature
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of persons in general? A fulfilment of the quest for our utmost reality?
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If that is indeed what we attempt to do here, then the word ‘I’ seems totally erroneous, or used fundamentally different from what we usually mean with ‘I’ in English.
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I go to work, I live in the Netherlands, I have aching toes, I love my wife, I am filled with wonder about my existence… The word ‘I’ knows a certain ‘grammar’. Of course a grammar in the sense of schoolbook syntax, in which it is a personal pronoun, but here we mean with ‘grammar of a word’ the specific logic, the ‘correct’ way it can be used. It is quite challenging to clarify the limits of the proper use of this word, or most words, but
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human beings do have the capacity, even from young age, to recognize the proper usage of a word. The examples I mentioned are fine. However, ‘he puts I on the toast’ is, both by deep grammar or just syntax, simply a baloney way of putting the word in a sentence. It is not an incorrect expression due to an invalid opinion, but the ‘grammar’ of the word here is misconceived.
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But surely we can replace ‘I’ by other words that do provide valid statements? That sufficiently conforms to the grammar, even without losing the meaning of what is said. René goes to work, René lives in the Netherlands, René has aching toes… And if that is fine, why cannot we express real thoughts by replacing ‘I’ by brain? As it is also fine to say ‘I am a European’ and hence ‘this European has aching toes’.
9:57
Certainly not. The ‘grammar’ of ‘brain’ fully differs from the grammar of ‘I’. The brain does not have toes, let alone aching toes (a brain has hemispheres and lobes, but no toes). Saying ‘my brain’s toes hurt’ is displaying a misconception of what a brain in English is, it does not match the grammatical possibilities it has. In the same way: the brain does not go to the office, the brain does not love somebody,
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nor is it astonished. These are all things that I do. It may perfectly be necessary for me to have a brain in order to do all these things. Just like I need eyes to be able to see. I look with my eyes, but it is not my eyes that are looking, I look, and use my eyes for that.
10:42
Rejecting the expression ‘I am a brain’ is not itself a metaphysical statement, it is merely the effort not to be bewitched by language. It is an attempt to withstand the superficial validity of such an assertion or to be tempted into thinking that it has a similar meaning to ‘I am a boy’.
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So, if I am not my brain, simply because I am not an organ, but a person, isn’t that a clue for the competing candidate, the self-image in which I say that I am a Mind?
11:12
The same applies here. There are many things you can say concerning the Mind. ‘My Mind is slow today’, ‘My Mind is clear’, etcetera, and even ‘maybe my Mind will keep existing after my body is deceased’ (though you might in this way refer to your Mind as some kind of body, see below). Again: you simply cannot state in English that my Mind’s toes hurt, again: no toes to be found here. Neither is it my Mind that travels to the office, my Mind does not
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love my wife, my Mind does not reside somewhere (though possibly metaphorically in philosophy or in the arts). These are all things that I do, and not a mental thing or aspect of mine.
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There may be overlap. Saying that my Mind is sad, means to say that I am sad. Just like ‘someone touches my body (or even my clothes)’ means that someone touches me. That does not imply that what I mean with ‘I’ coincides with ‘my mind’.
12:03
Again, the rejection is not a metaphysical statement, but it is an expression of doing the grammar of ‘I’ and of Mind justice. It is the endeavour not to speak nonsense.
12:15
‘a 100 dollars equal a 100 dollars’ / ‘Everything (including strawberries) is Mind’ / ‘Everything (including thoughts) is matter’ / ‘Beside (or in) my body there is my mind’ – these are all highly suspicious utterances in which words are used awkwardly and are hardly understandable. This tends to result in nonsense. But, isn’t this just playing with words? The issue at stake is not merely the exact meaning of a more or less random formulation? We are
12:44
dealing with respectable traditions like Dualism that defend, and rightly so, the insight that we are more than a bunch of molecules. A tradition that aligns with our deeply felt experience that, in one way or another, we have an inner life, a realm of feelings and thoughts.
13:00
It took great thinkers several decades to unnerve the implications of these traditions. To expect we can get this a 100% clear in a few minutes is not realistic. Especially as the philosophy of Wittgenstein is not so much a matter of statements to be proven, but a way of thinking, a specific focus on the language we use. This attention can reveal the subtle but fatal misconception, that is inherent in impressive sounding expressions like
13:25
‘every thing is equal to itself’. I’ll add an attempt to clarify the background and deeper meaning of this criticism on Metaphysics as a whole. Metaphysics investigates the real reality, what is below the surface of impressions and opinions. The assumption here is that we need some deeper reality to sufficiently know what we are.
13:45
Indeed: we can find many still unknown causes and patterns of our human behaviour and experiences. This is something we quite successfully achieve by what we call science and reflection (or ‘Phenomenology’). Still: what we are, we already know this. In a certain manner, the whole of reality lies clearly before us, out in the open, says Wittgenstein. Reality as such, that what triggers us into philosophy, is familiar, because, with some exceptions,
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we know how to apply the word ‘real’. We know the ‘grammar’ of real and reality.
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So, where do these metaphysical views (if they can be understood as coherent views) originate from?
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A possible and simple explanation would be the following. We have learned to analyse things, to take them apart in components. This is a meaningful and useful activity. It is good to know how the human body works, how the solar system is composed, what ingredients are to be found in Coca Cola. Especially since the birth of modern science (say: since the 16th century), it turned out to be both inspiring and enriching to analyse as much as possible,
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and by understanding the parts to have a better insight in the phenomena as a whole.
14:57
For a physicalist it is an obvious urge to find the organ or organs in the human body that are essential to the functioning of the body as a whole: registering input, process food and move. These are functionalities that correspond to what we call the behaviour of people: to see, eat, talk, walk, etc. The approach is fully understandable, but no justification whatsoever to reduce and identify a person to and with a collection of cells.
15:27
Concerning our mental world, it is common practice to use physical metaphor. Something ‘runs’ through my mind, I ‘explode’ of anger, influences ‘rip me apart’, I am ‘connecting’ several ideas, there’s a mental ‘process’ when I am thinking to come to a conclusion. Et cetera. This is all fine, natural and communicative.
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From this it is just a tiny step to take the successful ‘physical mode’ of thinking and applying it to the Mind. That is: to take metaphor as a description of literal truth, to transfer the way we approach tangible things to the intangible. This seems to be the basic error, when people defend a causal relation between physical matters and matters of the mind.
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Such thinking does not take into account the ‘grammar’ of ‘Mind’, ‘mental’ and the like. It turns the Mind into a kind of stuff, into something that, like tangible objects is in a specific location and that exerts and undergoes influences from physical items or forces. It is taken as similar to stones in avalanches and planets is the solar system, similar to cogwheels in the big clock of reality. In other words: it is seen as a kind of physical,
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albeit physical in a subtle, transparent, ethereal way. In the physical approach it is fine to analyse things and situations into their constituting parts, like springs and hooks in watches or particles in a molecule. But to apply this mode of thinking to the mental, amounts to asking questions in which only inapt answers can arise.
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Next to words like ‘equal’, Wittgenstein discusses many words that count as ‘mental’: sadness, knowing, meaning, hope, seeing. When we investigate the ‘grammar’ of these words, a grammar we implicitly already know, we see two things.
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Firstly: the meaning of each word is extremely diverse in every possible context in which it can occur. This removes the temptation to treat words mainly as ‘labels’ or ‘names’ and consequently to search for the objects that the words might ‘refer’ to. That is: to search for mental objects as pendants of physical objects we label. Secondly, as long as we withstand the inclination to think of the mental as a kind of ‘stuff’,
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as long as we don’t assume mental mechanisms, the metaphysical views are not only obsolete, but skewing and damaging for how we see ourselves. For example, what we mean with a word like ‘to mean’ is, in view of the skill with which we apparently can use it, metaphysical constructions aside, not a ‘hidden phenomenon’, not a ‘process’ as a pendant of chemical processes.
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Most images that we associate with the mental are perfectly in order. Say: the ‘focus’ of our attention, or the ‘inner process’ when pondering on something. But taken literally, these images trick us. Especially the image of an ‘inner world’, is in itself respectable and fitting to illustrate the feelings and thoughts we want to keep to ourselves. But nothing more. This doesn’t mean – like some people might think – that Wittgenstein sees the meaning of mental
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concepts as referring to behaviour. As if only an ‘outside’ world of bodies in movement is real. It does mean that we cannot cut loose the meaning of words from the publicly accessible world.
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Language is something inherently social. Every word can only have meaning is as much as it matters, when it makes a difference, between the people communicating. Understanding the way in which language works lets us say goodbye to the ‘inner world’ in the sense of an absolutely isolated private realm as construed in the 17th century.
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Both ‘I am a brain’ and ‘I am a Mind’ express a reductionist tendency. Both try to reduce me to something I am not. But then: what am I? If we have processed all criticism we find in Wittgenstein, what remains? Maybe, against reductionism, we should try to combine the parts of Mind and Body and see the person as the whole of these? No. Such a part-whole approach would still see a human being as a collection of items,
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like the molecules of sugar that form a sugar cube. It would still make use of a materialist framework, which would deny our undeniable mental and spiritual nature. I am not a ‘collection’ that loves, is responsible, etc. It is in any case me that does or is so. And even our undeniable physical nature is not respected in this way. My body is not merely a combination of organs, it is the way I find myself standing in the world. Somebody
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touching my arm is touching me, because it is an inter-subjective, personal contact. The spark that is ignited between two human beings that choose to be near, can be a connection between souls. To be sure: there is a pattern of colours of the word ‘I’ in each context. The nuances of ‘I’ in ‘I am into jazz’ and ‘I go into the room’ are part of a family of possibilities of the word. But still I am not a pattern. I am a human being.
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You know very well what I am. I am a person with a name and distinct properties. After all attention we gave to language, I am still myself (I am, so to say, identical to myself), with all mental, physical, economical, legal attributes: I feel, I ponder, I way 80kg, and I sit on the chair that I own. In a very diverse manner I know who and what I am – which is an insight that keeps deepening itself – because I know the grammar of ‘I’.
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Having said all this, it does not mean that it is easy to resist the lure of materialist thinking. Even now I sometimes find myself picturing my ‘I’ as a something in my skull, or as a something – apart from my body – in the room. A kind of energy, or a transparent ‘field’ that comes into existence as soon as I am awake. We misrepresent our nature when we take ourselves to be ‘spirits in a material world’. But even if we are successful in refusing the degradation to
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either brain or Mind, still there are many ways in which we can know ourselves and people in general.
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I am miraculous. Not because I am constructed from mysterious components with mysterious relations, but because this is my life. Because I see meaning in what I encounter and in the words that we use. Meaning that is not depending on some ultimate explanation or some foundation in a reality beyond appearances. Existence, such a trigger for wonder in philosophy, and rightly so, is not hidden. The whole of reality lies clearly before us, out in the open.
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